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ABSTRACT
This thesis analytically examines air rights development in the
airspace above existing urban transit corridors. Specific
attention has been directed toward Boston and The Massachusetts
Turnpike Authority, on the one hand, and upon Copley Place, on the
other.
The attached analysis has been conducted within a comprehensive
framework focusing on the legal, technical, social, and financial
components unique to air rights development. The emphasis has
been on clarifying the exceptional constraints imposed by air
rights, as well as on highlighting their enormous potential.
Although development of the airspace above existing urban transit
corridors has been advocated on the basis of a number of divergent
and compelling grounds,- the inherent difficulty of such airspace
development has proven to minimize the number of projects taking
advantage of this unique medium. Through a process intended to
demystify air rights and identify their appropriate role in the
revitalization of our urban centers, this examination has explored
the many facets of their complex structure. Specific attention
has been directed to an exploration of the design implications of
constructing in airspace.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Bernard Frieden
Title: Professor
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I. INTRODUCTION:
Culus est solum, eius est usque ad coelum
This Latin maxim, as codified into English common law doctrine, is
the originating principle which recognized the legal ownership of
rights in air space.(1) This doctrine concretized the fact that
whosoever owned a surface parcel of land also owned a modified,
inverted, pyramid which projected out from the center of the
earth--encompassed the ground--and extended into the heavens
above.(2) As this concept of ownership was originally conceived,
there were neither theoretical restrictions to land ownership, nor
legal differentiations between the land itself and the space
above. Currently, however, there are such restrictions, and there
is the opportunity for such differentiation.
Throughout this examination we will pursue an understanding of
contemporary air rights development within a framework that
encompasses the technical, legal, social, and financial
considerations of such development. In particular, an examination
will be made into the implications of air rights development
within the envelope of space above existing urban transit
corridors. Although the information gathered has focused on
Boston, the questions raised and solutions offered are seen to be
applicable to numerous American urban areas.
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II. OVERVIEW:
Air rights development above railway yards and highways has been
construed to be of significant potential value for a number of
various reasons. Some proponents have expressed interest in such
development in order to knit together communities which were torn
asunder when transit corridors were introduced. Others have seen
an opportunity to recreate revenue producing real estate by
building taxable structures over untaxed property. Developers
have recognized that surface urban transit corridors often
represent the largest available sites suitable for redevelopment
in dense urban locations. Economists have based their interest in
air rights development upon economic rationalizations of density
maximization, and transportation planners have pursued the concept
of synergy between transportation networks and the structures
built above them. A prominent structural engineer who has written
extensively on air rights has summed up the virtues of their
development in the following manner:
Air rights development over depressed roadways offers many
advantages: the repair of neighborhoods divided by
expressways, improved access to...ammenities, and the
creation of valuable real estate from what would otherwise
be considered "waste" space around and over the highways
that scar the downtowns of many cities. And air rights also
offer excellent opportunities to improve highway safety as
part of the building program.(3)
However, with these various concepts in mind, the key questions
which must be answered are: to what extent are such goals
compatible or mutually exclusive, and how can harmony be produced
from these potentially disparate elements.
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In an effort to proceed from a solid foundation of mutual
understanding, it is essential to take a momentary excursion into
the definitions of two key phrases which will be used through out
this examination. Mr. J. Keilch, a professor with the Department
of City and Regional Planning at the University of California,
Berkeley, offered the following definitions:
The terms "air rights" and "air space" are often used
interchangeably; however they have distinct meanings. Air
rights are the rights to inclusive and undisturbed use and
control of a designated space within delineated boundaries,
either at the surface (e.g. under a freeway overpass) or
above a stated elevation. Such rights may be purchased or
leased for the construction of improvements under or above a
structure. Air rights, like mineral easements, are only a
partial interest. Air space is the separate parcel and
legally described area above or under another structure.(4)
Mr. M. Bernard, editor of Reflections on Space, has written that:
Air rights are rights in air space--and constitute part of
the "bundle of rights" comparable to those relating to land
itself.(5)
III. GENERIC CONDITIONS:
With the foregoing definitions in mind, it is important to
understand that we are not solely dealing with the legal existence
of air rights and an owner's ability to treat them as real
property, but with the practical and logistical requirements
necessary to develop those rights within a framework of
identifiable public and private goals. As such, prior to
investigating specific methodologies and examples, it is necessary
to establish a generic perspective for understanding the
contextual implications of air rights development over urban
transit corridors.
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Initially, one must be able to conceptualize air rights
development within the context of a horizontal two dimensional
plane--essentially an architectural perspective in plan. When
viewed from this angle, it is immaterial whether the given transit
corridor which transverses through an existing neighborhood is at,
below, or above, grade. The key element is one of separation, and
the key question is one of connection--should the areas separated
by the corridor be re-connected, and, if so, how. Whereas the
areas on either side of the corridor may be connected by cross
streets spanning that corridor at some more or less regular
interval, this occasional bridging is insignificant in comparison
to the potential effects of an air rights development constructed
to span the corridor itself.
Second, one has to be able to conceptualize air rights development
within the framework of a vertical two dimensional scheme--an
architectural perspective in section. When viewed in these terms,
the height or depth of the corridor and corresponding development
become the crucial factors. As a technical or legal matter, air
rights development can take place regardless of the corridors
location. However, as a practical matter height considerations
enable us to refine those questions of connectedness raised
earlier. When viewed within this vertical perspective, one is
able to ask: what are the implications for neighborhoods which
wish to be reunited across a corridor--will a highway "gash"
simply be replaced by a "spine" of tall buildings?
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Correspondingly, what are the implications of high density
development across transit corridors for those communities which
do not wish to be re-connected? Furthermore, can the development
rights which apply to the air rights above a corridor be
transferred along that corridor to facilitate the desires of both
types of neighborhoods?
Although connectedness is an overarching concern with regard to
air rights development, one must recognize that resolving that
issue simply broadens the scope of inquiry. An analyst who has
done extensive research into those issues which are unique to air
rights development has isolated twenty key factors which are
crucial to planning for successful air space projects. He frames
those issues in the guise of the following questions:
1. What are the existing land uses in each of the.. .abutting
parcels?
2. Are the existing...land uses compatible if they were to
be united?
3. How do...parcel land use regulations compare (e.g.
zoning)?
4. In particular, what...are allowable building heights?
5. How do land elevations and general topography compare?
6. What are the comparative assessed values in the abutting
parcels?
7. What are the estimated "highest and best use" valuations
for the abutting parcels?
8. What are the soil or structural limitations in the
abutting parcels and in the right-of-way?
9. How will traffic and transportation access be affected by
uniting a given set of abutting parcels?
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10. What is the square foot construction cost of a
"platform" or supporting structure over the right-of-way
parcel?
11. What are the ventilation or anti-pollution costs for
covering over the right-of-way parcel?
12. What is the development and land value trend in the
general area?
13. What is the acreage of the individual parcels and the
consolidated acreage of the airspace and abutting
parcels?
14. What property interests has the highway fee owner been
legally authorized to convey to a developer in the
airspace parcel ("air-rights")? What rights in the
underlying land for support and utility purposes? Are
there any time restrictions or encumbrances?
15. What is the "economic threshold" where development land
values will exceed the cost of a platform or support
system?
16. What are the ownerships of the.. .abutting parcels?
17. Are there any parallel ownerships with relation to the
right-of-way (railroad or mass transit trackage is not
infrequently present)?
18. What permits, approvals and government agencies will be
involved in consolidation of the parcels and their
development?
19. Is right-of-way coverage (of a cut) indicated for
certain highway sections, with restriction on any
development?
20. What parcels appear to have "connectivity", and how
might they best be "clustered" to form a consolidated
parcel for an appropriate use or development?(6)
With these questions in mind to focus our analysis and to draw our
attention to the general issues involved, it is possible to
proceed to a more detailed, in depth, discussion.
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III.1. PLANNING ISSUES:
As has been indicated above, planning concerns loom especially
large within the context of air rights development. The
interrelationships between city agencies, state authorities, and
community concerns are extraordinarily complex. Given the fact
that the air space above transit corridors is usually owned by
quasi-governmental state agencies--in the specific case of Boston,
by the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority (MTA) and the
Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA)--the private
developer is forced to broaden his scope of focus as he pursues
approval for his project. Insofar as air rights development
brings the developer into negotiation not only with the customary
array of city and community groups, but also with those state
transportation agencies who own the land over which he proposes to
construct his platform and superstructure, he is faced with an
additional layer of development risk. The development of terra
firma projects is a relatively straightforward endeavor in
comparison to the obstacles encountered when developing property
above active transportation lanes. Essentially, air rights
developments must be concerned with the full weight of traditional
planning questions, be they technical or aesthetic, while
concomitantly addressing the complex issues fostered by the
necessity of continual coordination with the transit agencies
involved. Mr. M. Joliffe, a structural engineer responsible for
the successful organization of a number of Boston air rights
projects has made the following observation:
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Particularly crucial is the coordination between the engine-
ering staff representing the client, and that of the pub-
lic works authorities, for once the legal hurdles to project
approval are met, it is they who will interface daily.(7)
111.2. FINANCIAL ISSUES:
Financial considerations also take on a unique, critical, and
complex perspective when analyzing air rights developments.
Essentially, air rights are leased to prospective developers based
on the assessed value of adjacent land, allowing for the expense
of platform costs, the lack of demolition costs, etc., or an a
residualized income basis. For such leases to be economically
feasible it is essential that the surrounding land or proposed
project be of sufficient value that the economic threshold be
crossed whereby the increased construction, engineering, and
permitting expenses of air rights development can be justified.
In addition, air rights are traditionally leased on an
unsubordinated basis, similar in concept to unsubordinated ground
leases. This arrangement makes financing air rights developments
understandably problematic, for financial institutions are
notoriously reluctant to stand in a second position with regard to
the land owner in the event of project default. Further
complicating financial matters is the fact that multiple use air
rights developments which involve numerous joint ventures (i.e.
Copley Place), must clearly define the relationship which is to
exist between the various joint venturers themselves.(8) Such
definition is crucial to protect against the possibility of one
joint venturer falling into default and, therefore, being unable
to pay its assessed share of the air rights rent due.
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Theoretically, this one default could result in a revocation of
the entire lease. In such a scenario, the surviving joint
ventures would be forced into a position of paying the revenue
difference, or facing lease cancellation. Such conditions
compound financing problems, placing a premium on ingenuity and
fiscal strength.
Whereas these problems are not insurmountable, they do require
financial innovation. For example, Urban Investment and
Development Company (UIDC), the developers of Copley Place,
devised a system whereby they calculated the present value of the
projected rent stream due the MTA and purchased sufficient
Treasury Bills so that their interest paid the assessed air rights
rent in guaranteed installments. The result of this financing
method was to essentially prepay, i.e. "buy", the lease. Owning
the lease made subsequent financing less problematic, but such a
scheme obviously requires careful analysis, intricate legal lease
negotiations, and substantial equity. The following section of
the Copley Place lease agreement which was signed by UIDC (as the
tenant) and by the MTA (as the land owner) details the terms that
were employed with regard to financing the air rights for that
particular project.
... the Tenant shall acquire and deposit with the Escrow
Agent United States Treasury Bonds 7-5/8% due February 15,
2007, callable not earlier than February 15, 2002, paying
interest at an annual rate of not less than $1,200,000, and
having a total par value at maturity of not less than
$15,800,000, to secure performance of its obligations.(9)
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111.3. TECHNICAL ISSUES:
In considering the unique technical aspects of air rights
development, the one maxim which must be placed in the forefront
of all others--regardless of the potential value of the proposed
development--is that the leasing authority must maintain its
fiduciary relationship to the public in terms of insuring
unimpeded traffic flow through out the construction period (and
subsequent operation) of the air rights development. Whereas
negotiated transportation improvements may temporarily impact
traffic flow, maintaining service is the primary consideration and
concern of the leasing authority. As such, developers are forced
to endure a variety of additional costs and logistical problems
which must be included into their pro forma calculations. Such
premium costs are multi-faceted and include, for example, the
necessity of paying overtime wages due to the need to perform
substantial amounts of work during those times when the roads and
rails are least travelled--i.e. midnight till dawn. Additionally,
the costs of required transportation infrastructure changes needed
to accommodate the proposed superstructure, or required as part of
the lease package to improve transit facilities, must be analyzed.
As has been noted, consideration must be paid to problems and
costs of lighting the corridor beneath the platform, ventilating
that corridor, arranging for adequate fire protection, mitigating
echo, etc.
Page: 13
Additional unique problems include those which concern
pre-construction staging and actual project construction.
Essentially, the contractor must be able to supply his job in the
absence of a usable site, for until the requisite platform is
completed the site may (practically speaking) not exist. Insofar
as specific air rights developments may include parcels of terra
firma unencumbered by transportation easements, these technical
gymnastics may be made more manageable, but their awesome scope
must be acknowledged none the less. A principal with Zaldastani
Associates--the Boston firm responsible for the structural
engineering of the Hancock Garage and Copley Place--has written
about the extraordinary coordination required by air rights
projects in the following terms:
Our experience in these complex projects points out the
particular engineering and logistical challenges of highway
air rights construction. The structural engineer is
required to find innovative means to underpin large
structures where foundation and support column locations are
extremely limited by underlying transportation corridors.
Access to the site and locating adequate staging areas for
moving and storing equipment and materials may also be
difficult. Often, roadways must be kept open and railways
clear as construction proceeds, and phased strategies must
be worked out to bring the project to completion
economically, quickly, and safely.(10)
All of these above considerations are essentially extras--those
typical technical issues of soil capacity testing, neighborhood
traffic impact analysis, superstructure impact studies (i.e.
sunlight and shadow concerns), must all be addressed. The design
implications of the constraints which are unique to air rights
development will be discussed in a subsequent chapter.
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111.4. LEGAL ISSUES:
The last generic topic to be considered is that of the legal
framework within which air rights leases must be negotiated. In
discussing the primary legal issue of sovereignty between city and
state, it must be noted that the applicability of zoning statutes
is a function of the enabling legislation creating the transit
authority. For example, the MTA is by statute obligated to abide
by the zoning ordinances of every municipality through which its
land passes, other than those zoning ordinances in effect for the
city of Boston. Ironically, Boston is the one area where such air
rights development is most likely to occur due to the values of
adjacent land. As a practical matter, however, transportation
agencies are extremely sensitive to local political concerns.
This attentiveness is manifested in the necessity for the governor
to sign any air rights lease which exceeds forty years. Hence,
unless the statehouse is willing to explicitly ignore city hall,
air rights developments will fundamentally conform to applicable
by-laws, or pertinent guidelines. As an example of the degree to
which it is possible for the state, through the MTA, to forge a
legal framework encouraging a developer to accept appropriate city
and community guidelines, one can cite the work of the Citizens
Review Committee (CRC) as their efforts were employed within the
Copley Place development process. Essentially, at the Governor's
request the Office of State Planning (OSP) organized the CRC to
"identify design, environmental, economic and community
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considerations to serve as guidelines for the development". (11)
As UIDC, Copley's designated developer, tested the degree to which
the state would support the guidelines, it became clear that "OSP
would back up the CRC recommendations". (12)
Another interesting legal scenario which should be mentioned at
this point is that of parallel ownership. In such situations, two
or more different transportation authorities occupy adjacent land
upon which their transit corridors are located. This adjacency
brings an additional element of legal logistics into play.
Essentially, in Boston there is no established framework to
address potentially divergent transportation authority concerns.
The resolution of outstanding issues are decided on a more or less
ad hoc, case by case basis, dependent upon the ingenuity of the
developer and the perspective of the transit authorities
themselves. Unless the different transportation agencies effected
are able to present a unified position in terms of lease duration,
remuneration, valuation, etc., a developer's ability to codify
lease terms will be extremely difficult, and potentially costly.
One approach to resolving this issue has been the acceptance of
the master lease concept, a concept employed by the MTA and
Conrail with regard to Copley Place. Under a master lease
framework, the authority with the preponderance of air rights to
lease (in this case, the MTA) negotiates terms with the
prospective developer (UIDC) and pro-rates the rent ultimately
received by paying the adjoining authority involved (i.e.
Conrail) its percentage based minority share.(13) Obviously, such
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intricacies are not required if the land is owned by a single body
which has only granted another transportation authority surface
easement rights.
IV. LEGISLATIVE EVOLUTION:
In considering the development of air rights legislation, a
momentary word on the origins of joint development in the United
States with regard to roadway subspace is appropriate. The great
onslaught of highway, freeway, and expressway construction of the
fifties and sixties quickly established the need to address the
impact of these transit corridors. The first such efforts focused
on utilizing the airspace under these structures for commercial
purposes. Although these commercial ventures--parking lots,
trailer storage yards, etc.--did little to mend the social fabric
torn by the roadway itself, they did provide rental revenue.
Subsequent subspace development efforts attempted to address
social ills by locating play grounds for children and benches for
the elderly directly under elevated sections of the road system.
Although gallant in effort, such subspace was inherently
unfriendly, and efforts to humanize these spaces at this early
stage were mostly unsuccessful. A striking example of such
design/use incompatibility can be seen under the Mass Pike where
it crosses Commonwealth Avenue at Kenmore Square--the lonely
benches located there stand as testimony to a failed concept.
However, the legislation that provided for these projects was far
reaching in objective--even if limited in success--and is the fore
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runner of MTA air rights legislation. As can be seen from the
following statement of intent, the original goals of joint
development were strikingly similar to the concerns which
currently exist with regard to the utilization of air rights.
Highway joint development projects have been carried out for
a multitude of purposes, but basically the objective sought
has been a higher measure of compatibility between the
highway facility and its environment. This attainment may
be measured in terms of savings and replacements as to land,
money, (and) public facilities... (14)
These combined objectives of addressing revenue potential and
societal need led inexorably to further enabling legislation which
detailed the conditions whereby federally and/or state funded
transit corridors could be used to aggressively pursue air
rights development.
In Boston, current discussions of air rights development primarily
focus upon the Mass Pike, for it is the most visible scar within
the city, and its extensive, centrally located body has steadily
fostered interest in its development potential. However, in the
belief that the possibilities of further development over fixed
rail should not be totally ignored, we will briefly examine MBTA
legislation in addition to the applicable MTA laws.
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IV.1. THE MASSACHUSETTS TURNPIKE AUTHORITY:
In 1963 the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority adopted an amendment
providing for the lease of air rights--specifically, Section 15A:
"Utilization of Air Rights". To quote from Section 15A itself:
... the Authority may ... lease... for a term... not to exceed
ninety nine years... air rights over land owned or held by
the Authority in connection with the Massachusetts
Turnpike... as, in the opinion of the Authority will not
impair the construction, full use, safety, maintenance,
repair, operation or revenues of the Massachusetts Turnpike,
provided, however, that any such lease for a period of forty
years or more shall be subject to the approval of the
governor. (15)
Two significant observations can be made at this point. First,
the MTA is not empowered to sell their air rights, they may simply
lease them. Second, the political importance of air rights
development is explicitly recognized insofar as the governor is
granted veto power over the MTA's ability to enter into long term
leases.
Perhaps the most unusual feature of this legislation are the
clauses which refer to applicable zoning restrictions. Section
15A specifically exempts air rights development within Boston from
the city's zoning requirements, while concomitantly subjecting all
other air rights development along its length to all applicable
zoning statutes. To quote Section 15A once again:
Use of air rights under this section respecting land within
the territorial limits of the city of Boston...shall not be
subject to any... zoning ordinance, rule or regulation
applicable in the city of Boston.(16)
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Furthermore:
The construction... of any building... erected... under any
lease under this section of air rights respecting land
outside the territorial limits of the city of Boston shall
be subject to the... zoning laws... and zoning ordinances,
by-laws, rules and regulations applicable in the city or
town in which such building... is located.(17)
Further complicating this sovereignty issue is the clause which
states that even though legally exempt from Boston zoning
restrictions, the Authority shall not lease any air rights
relating to the Boston Extension unless the Authority is able to
conclude that the proposed development is beneficial. To quote
from Section 15A for the final time:
The Authority shall not lease any air rights... in the city
of Boston unless the Authority shall find, after
consultation with the Mayor, that the construction... will
preserve and increase the amenities of the community.(18)
Interestingly, this dichotomy provides a unique opportunity for
negotiation. By exempting air rights development from zoning but
subjecting it to mayoral approval, Section 15A provides a window
for creative input. The participants in the Copley Place project
recognized this opportunity, and utilized the aforementioned
guidelines devised by the Citizens Review Committee in lieu of
established zoning statutes. Mr. K. Himmel of UIDC has written:
Since the site, owned by the Massachusetts turnpike
Authority, is exempted from the City of Boston zoning
ordinances, the development envelope with which the
project (i.e. Copley Place) has been designed was
established by the Citizen's Review Committee Process.
Guidelines and recommendations were established which,
in general, set the parameters of (the) building
program. (19)
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Furthermore, it was recognized that:
The ultimate card in the state's hand derived from
state ownership of the land, and the consequent legal
requirement that the governor sign the lease for the
developer to build on land owned by the MTA. In other
words, the state could build into the lease agreement
the specific requirements it wanted.(20)
The remainder of Section 15A establishes two secondary, but
pertinent points. The first of these two points establishes the
lessee's obligations with regard to payment of applicable fees.
This clause confirms the unsubordinated nature of any air rights
lease negotiated between the MTA and a developer, with the proviso
that any default on the part of the developer cannot implicate the
Authority with regard to delinquent or outstanding financial
obligations. The second point establishes the lessee's right to
assign or mortgage his air rights lease provided prior approval is
granted by the Authority.
Interestingly, there is no call for the Authority to pursue any
form of master planning with regard to the disposition of Mass
Pike air rights. Perhaps as a harbinger of things to come,
applications are currently being accepted by the Authority for the
newly created post of "Director of Planning and Development". A
primary focus for this new director will be to coordinate planning
in an effort to maximize real estate value through the promotion
of air rights development.(21)
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IV.2. MASSACHUSETTS BAY TRANSIT AUTHORITY:
As detailed in the MBTA study entitled "Joint Development", the
Authority appears to have a complex framework in place to consider
issues of public/private partnerships, but to date their emphasis
on air rights development itself has been quite circumspect. In
fact, the MBTA has yet to aggressively pursue air rights
development, although the Authority has the jurisdiction to do so
through Chapter 16A of the Mass General Laws.(22) One potential
reason for this lack of emphasis may be the fact that MBTA tracks
are currently underground, and covered, in those areas where the
high density and correspondingly high land values requisite for
viable air rights development exist. Recently, however, there has
been increased interest on the part of the Authority with regard
to pursuing untapped air rights potential. The Authority's
sharpened focus is made explicit in the first point of an eight
point agenda established by the MBTA's Department of Real Estate
Development. To quote the MBTA itself:
(The Department shall) identify MBTA parcels, including air
rights, which are appropriate for development, either to
enhance transit amenities or to re-use excess (and
potentially blighted) parcels for the capture of value to
the MBTA and the generation of public benefits.(23)
Interestingly, the MBTA's only current foray into the field of air
rights development involves an unusual twist. The Authority is
presently negotiating the transfer of a section of their air
rights to a third party to enable that party to increase the
density of a project proposed for an adjacent piece of tera firma.
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This transfer will be coupled to a legal guarantee whereby the
Authority will forswear their right to develop the area from which
their air rights have been transferred. Although this transfer is
currently under negotiation between the MBTA, Harvard University,
and the city of Cambridge, it may prove to be an interesting case
to analyze as the pertinent facts are made public.(24)
IV.3. BOSTON TURNPIKE PROPERTIES DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY:
The apparent absence of a planned approach to the development of
the air rights relating to the Mass Pike has recently given rise
to a piece of legislation which is currently, albeit circuitously,
moving through the City Council and the State Legislature. An
examination of the goals and conflicts within this proposed
legislation will highlight a number of illuminating issues with
regard to urban air rights development.
Jurisdictional Questions:
Originally drafted under the auspices of Councillor Scondras'
office, "An Act Establishing the Boston Turnpike Properties
Development Authority" attempts to address the dual problems of
traffic congestion and affordable housing in Boston through air
rights development. To quote from the proposed Act:
It is hereby found and declared that congestion in the
downtown area of the City of Boston has reached a point
where public safety requires an urgent solution to the
impact of development and necessitates the utilization of
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the air rights and abutting property presently owned by the
Massachusetts Turnpike Authority as one of several
approaches to this problem. It is further found and
declared that the economic health of the region surrounding
the Turnpike within the City of Boston requires a solution
to the problem of traffic congestion and the problem of lack
of affordable housing. An appropriate set of structures
built over the Massachusetts Turnpike within the City of
Boston in such a fashion as to allow entry and egress from
the Turnpike to and from parking garages, ...which also
allows for the creation of new... residential housing,
particularly low and moderate-low housing, and which allows
for the creation of new commercial space would provide
substantial benefits to the citizens of the
commonwealth.(25)
Interestingly--and, perhaps, illustratively--although the bill was
conceptualized at the city level, it was immediately passed to
Representative Roosevelt for presentation and debate in the state
legislature. This legislative hand off from the city to the state
was precipitated by the belief that insofar as the MTA is a state
authority, any legislation dealing with its land or the rights
pertaining to that land must be legally addressed at the state
level. However, when the bill was presented to the state house
clerk in order for it be assigned a rotation number and a hearing
date, it was returned to Roosevelt's office with the adviso that a
Home Rule Petition would have to passed by the City Council prior
to its being considered by the state. (26) Such slippage can be
seen to underscore the potential for ambivalence with regard to
the issue of sovereignty over planning decisions as they relate to
MTA real estate.
Insofar as such political ambivalence may exist, it will
inevitably focus developers attention on the need to build in
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additional profit margins to account for the extra effort that may
be required to move through the permitting process.
Concomitantly, the private developer will be forced to factor into
his proforma the associated risks which may accompany such
permitting delays--such as fluctuating interest rates, changing
market conditions, missed completion dates, etc. However one must
question the efficacy of creating a new Authority to address such
issues, and must consider the likelihood that such a new Authority
will simply add yet another layer of bureaucratic delay. To
quote Mr. J. Feaster, the MTA's acting director for real estate
development:
What do we need it (a new Authority) for? Read the
statutes. The MTA has the authority to do what this
legislation calls for. And why would we agree to
surrender our control?(27)
Perhaps institutionalized coordination between those Authorities
already in existence and empowered to consider developmental
questions (i.e. the BRA and the MTA itself) is the vehicle that
would most efficiently handle potential jurisdictional disputes
and minimize their cost. In fact, a model for such institution-
alized coordination may be found with reference to the Development
Cabinet which facilitated the Copley Place project. State
Planning Director during the Copley development, Mr. F. Keefe,
has stated that:
... the Development Cabinet exerted a key structural
influence on the Copley project. The Cabinet was an
interagency coordinating committee... (which) meant that
member agencies 'did not have an independent turf. We would
proceed with a single development agenda.' It provided an
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arena for the direct expression of competing interests, and
permitted a complicated mixture of goals to be advocated and
accommodated within a single project.(28)
Whereas the high powered precedent of the Development Cabinet may
not be appropriate for smaller scale projects, insofar as that
body consisted of four state Cabinet officers as well the
director of the Office of State Planning, it offers an alternative
concept to the creation of a new Authority to focus attention on
air rights development.
Introduction Of Planning:
An interesting element of the proposed Act which should be
examined is its call for the establishment of a "Turnpike Plan".
Although the envisioned plan emphasizes the need to promote
parking facilities and housing, the essential feature is the call
to consider the collective development potential of the Mass Pike.
Specifically, the legislation recommends parking structures
designed for the entry and exit of cars directly from the Turnpike
with limited city street access, on the one hand, and housing
densities which conform to the surrounding communities, on the
other. To quote from the proposed legislation:
The Turnpike plan... shall be the result of careful studies
undertaken by the Authority in conjunction with the Boston
Department of Transportation.. .The Turnpike Plan, when
completed, shall be submitted to the City Council of Boston
and the Mayor of Boston for their approval, and without such
approval, no activity of the Authority may proceed pursuant
to the plan... There shall be an community advisory committee
to the development of the plan... (and) if the CAC does not
vote approval to the plan, an environmental impact statement
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shall be filed... (29)
While there is a serious question with regard to the viability of
parking oriented projects being developed in neighborhoods which
seek re-unification through low density urban residential
development, what is crucial is not the viability of the proposed
use mix, but the fact that for the first time the Mass Pike is to
be analyzed as an entire interconnected entity. It is precisely
this reference to planning which is missing from the MTA enabling
legislation, yet it is precisely this omission which the MTA is
attempting to remedy through the creation of the aforementioned
post of "Director for Planning and Development".
As planning of the Mass Pike proceeds--whether under the auspices
of an MTA Director, or a new authority--it is critical that the
mistakes of past urban renewal efforts be avoided. The prospect
of platforms erected without adequate private sector involvement
into site selection and sequencing could have effects as
devastating and as unintentional as the urban renewal programs of
the sixties. Without active private sector participation,
platforms constructed in accordance with a "plan" could remain as
barren as the vast tracts of city land which were cleared for
urban renewal only to remained undeveloped for decades.
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Bonds And Revenue Issues:
By way of final consideration of the important implications of the
proposed Act, one must examine the financial structure suggested.
The legislation calls for the issuance of bonds at a fixed
interest rate to underwrite the construction costs of those
projects which this new Authority deems appropriate and in accord
with the aforementioned Turnpike Plan. These bonds are guaranteed
solely by the new Authority itself, and are not collateralized by
the MTA or any other city or state agency. The monies raised by
the sale of these bonds are to be used for underwriting
construction costs in the same manner that bonds were originally
issued by the MTA to construct the Mass Pike itself.(30)
Whereas the concept of development bonds is intriguing, the
issuance of such bonds need not be tied to the creation of a new
Authority. There is no legal justification which would prevent
the passage of a bill amending the MTA enabling legislation to
bestow upon the MTA itself the right to issue such bonds.
Ultimately, it appears that the Act's envisioned financing device
is appropriate only insofar as it allows for and promotes public
sector development and construction. Given the fact that the MTA
has established precedent for creative financing with regard to
encouraging private development when there is a viable proposal at
hand, one must question the necessity of such bonds for spurring
private sector interest in air rights development. With reference
to Copley Place once again, it is apparent that the state is very
aware of its role in financially encouraging air rights
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development. To quote Mr. F. Salvucci, the transportation
secretary in office at the time of the Copley Place negotiations:
It was... 'tremendously important that the Turnpike Authority
could define the value of the land.' It was a 'great luxury'
which meant that if the state decided to limit development
in any substantial way for environmental or social reasons,
it could reduce the value of the land and the lease price
accordingly.(31)
While it may be appropriate to argue that established planning
guidelines and financing incentives would encourage interest in
air rights projects lacking the scope (and political clout) of
Copley Place, it does not appear that this current legislation
will provide the tools necessary for encouraging such interest.
Although one must question the goals of the envisioned plan (and
the wisdom of so definitively setting those goals in an enabling
act) ; and whereas one must probe the details of the proposed bond
issue (and the viability of 8% returns); and insofar as one must
wonder about the efficacy of a new Authority (as opposed to better
MTA planning with BRA and community input); one is struck by the
focused interest on MTA air rights which is embodied in the
Scondras/Roosevelt proposal.
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V. VALUATION:
Even though the state has the authority to establish land values
based on considerations other than profit maximization, it is
necessary to understand the valuation methodologies employed with
regard to determining the market value of air rights. Regardless
of the scope of subsequent lease negotiations, both the public
agency and private developer involved must understand the nuance
of air rights appraisal. In so far as it has been recognized that
the exceptional cost of constructing in the airspace above a
highway or other transit corridor is a major impediment to private
development, appraisal calculations have been devised which
explicitly discount air rights value with regard to the increased
costs implicit in their development. To quote Mr. M. Regan, a
Boston based appraisor who has been involved with establishing air
rights values for the MTA:
Among the construction costs peculiar to air space
development (which should be considered in their valuation)
are the following:
1. lack of basement or subbasements for elevator,
maintenance, utilities, and services, requiring their
placement in other areas of the building;
2. reinforced floor on the first level above the highway for
safety purposes;
3. insulation of lower floors from noise, vibrations and
fumes;
4. construction of safety provisions to protect the highway
from falling objects;
5. potential special costs for access to the building(s) and
possibly for utility connections;
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6. due to the complexity of construction and the requirement
that traffic not be interrupted or endangered, the
overall construction time may be extended;
7. and it is reasonable to expect that negotiations and
approvals from federal, state and local agencies will
entail time delays and additional costs.(33)
However, air space utilization cannot be discounted purely on the
basis of these added costs--appropriate consideration must be
given to the potential savings involved. A brief analysis of the
two most common valuation techniques used to address this issue
follows.
V.I. COMPARATIVE LAND VALUE:
The original methodology used to value air rights is based upon
formulas which focus on comparable land sales. Starting with the
premise that an appraiser can use "comparative sales of land in
the vicinity", this approach identifies the savings attributable
to air space development, and then proceeds to deduct those costs
which are considered to be unique. The Highway Research board has
recommended the following formula in its report titled "The
Valuation of Air Space":
V + D + S + P - X - Y - I = A
in which:
V = comparable land value;
D = savings due to absence or reduction in demolition and
foundation costs;
S = value attributed to site prominence or improved access;
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P = savings due to readily assembled large parcel;
X = reduction in utility of structure due to design or functional
obsolescence;
Y = excess construction costs due to underlying highway;
I = additional interest incurred over a longer construction
period; and
A = appraised air rights value.(34)
While it is apparent that a number of these variables can be
ascertained with statistical accuracy, others are simply "best
guesses" which are open to differing interpretation and
potentially significant variation. For example, where as an
experienced contractor can be expected to reliably determine
premium construction costs, the calculations needed to factor the
assemblage or access premium is obviously less precise.
Essentially, through this concern for accuracy it has become an
accepted appraisal practice to use comparable land formulas only
as a means of complementing and supporting the results obtained
through use of the more sophisticated residual income approach.
To quote Mr. Regan once again:
This approach (comparable land value) is considered
complimentary and supportive of the residual approach. The
most recommended method of appraising air rights is the
residual income approach.(35)
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V.2. RESIDUAL CAPITALIZATION OF INCOME:
This methodology of air rights valuation essentially "backs in" to
a value for the air rights component of the projected development.
By assigning to the air rights the residual value of the project
after capping cash flows and subtracting total development
costs--including the developer's fees and entrepreneurial
return--the appraiser can determine the value of the air rights
themselves. Such an approach depends on establishing an income
and expense statement reflecting the project's expected revenues
and estimated costs. Allowing for appropriate proforma
considerations such as vacancies, tenant roll overs, brokerage
commissions, etc., the appraiser applies a capitalization
rate--which is determined with reference to comparable land based
properties recently sold and/or refinanced--to the net income
calculated. From this calculated figure, both hard and soft costs
as well as profit margins are deducted, and an amount available
for distribution as air rights rent is then established.
The residual capitalization of income approach is a more flexible
and more sophisticated valuation methodology than the comparable
land value model in that it implicitly recognizes that "rights"
are not the same as "real estate". To quote Mr. Regan one final
time:
This approach ('residual air-rights value by income
approach') incorporates the conclusions that:
1. air rights have commercial land value only in use or
recognized income potential;
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2. air space above a highway is significantly different
from a parcel of land;
3. the private market will not purchase or lease air rights
above a highway strictly on the basis of adjusted
comparable land values.(36)
As has been noted above, it has become the accepted practice for
transportation agencies to rely on independent appraisal analysis
to determine air rights values in order to establish a baseline
for their negotiations with private developers. However, the MTA
has stated that as a rule of thumb, a developer can estimate air
rights values to average ten percent of the total development
costs.(37)
The most intriguing element of this valuation approach is not in
consideration of the methodology itself, which is a widely
accepted real estate finance procedure for determining land
values, but is in consideration of the relationship it fosters
between the city and the state transit authority. It is evident
that such an approach encourages the transit authority to promote
high density and maximum development. As such, the state agency
is placed in a typical land owners position with regard to
building regulations and zoning restrictions. The degree to which
those revenue maximization considerations are tempered by other
concerns is, ultimately, a function of many political and social
factors. With reference, once again, to Copley Place, one can
clearly see the convergence of disparate factors leading the
state (i.e. the governor) to consider broader implications than
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simple revenue maximization through strident adherence to the
appraisor's interpretation of the value of an air rights lease.
In the words of Mr. T. Lee, an urban planner intimately involved
with Copley Place, it was clear that:
As with many major development efforts, the fate of this
project (i.e. Copley) was influenced greatly by recent
large scale development proposals.. .To local politicians,
Park Plaza (a contemplated, but never constructed,
downtown development) was a fearsome symbol of the
downside of development politics. Delays by the previous
administration ... had resulted in a protest march of
50,000 construction workers and their supporters.. .The
Dukakis administration had a strong interest in producing
a substantial development that would employ construction
workers.(38)
Whereas air rights value can theoretically be independently and
objectively determined by professional appraisors, one must
always keep in mind that their ultimate value is dependent on
the public sector's perception of the political climate, and the
proposed projects influence upon that climate.
VI. DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS:
Insofar as every major development within downtown Boston is
subject to considerable public and professional scrutiny with
regard to design review, the focus of this chapter will be on
analyzing those design considerations which are unique to air
rights developments. Specifically, the complex relationship which
exists between the transit corridor base and the air rights
superstructure will be analyzed, with a focus on exploring the
design implications of that relationship.
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At the outset, it must be noted that air rights projects can be
designed and constructed in a number of differing ways, with each
divergent method having unique design implications. For example,
with regard to sequencing, air rights developments can be built in
conjunction with (or prior to) the completion of the underlying
highway. Two examples of this type of sequencing were the Star
Market in Newton, and the Prudential center in Boston. Or, air
rights projects may be constructed after completion of the highway
itself, while the highway is actively used. Two examples of this
construction scenario were the John Hancock Garage and the Newton
Corner complex.
Concomitantly, air rights projects can be developed under
differing conditions, and differing degrees, of transit corridor
planning. For example, if steps are undertaken to facilitate
subsequent air rights development during initial highway design
and construction, center median strips can be widened and/or side
easements can be broadened to minimize the cost--and maximize the
range--of caisson and foundation placement. In addition, the
roadway itself can be depressed relative to the surrounding land
to ease the transition between that land and the platforms which
will be required for future development. However, the most
typical--and the most challenging--scenario is one in which the
developer is faced with a situation where prior planning has not
been implemented, and the highway underneath the proposed
development is actively used. Two examples of this situation are
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the completed Copley Place project, and the cancelled John Hancock
office/garage complex. Both of these developments will be
discussed in depth.
Before entering into a detailed analysis of these two projects,
there is one principal consideration crucial to the design of all
air rights developments which must be put to the forefront. That
consideration is size. The implications of size restraints and
density limitations with regard to the design of air rights
projects will be shown to be far reaching. However, at this point
it should be noted that Mr. Joliffe--the aforementioned structural
engineer recognized for his extensive work on air rights
technology--has stated:
It can be concluded that the buildings which are most
appropriate for air rights development are those of light
construction and, more particularly, those having a low live
load requirement.(39)
VI.1. COPLEY PLACE:
Copley Place is a mixed use as well as a mixed medium development,
and on the journey from concept to completion both of these mixes
have underground considerable modification. Given the technical
difficulties implicit in air rights development, the story of
Copley Place is uniquely instructive. Ultimately, the evolution
of Copley highlights the fact that the inherent limitations of
building in airspace will inevitably influence the final design of
a project, while it simultaneously focuses attention on the ways
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in which those very constraints can be altered to accommodate
changing economic realities.
Copley Place is built upon a 9.5 acre site, wholly owned by the
MTA, located between the Back Bay and the South End. The
structures comprising the development are either built directly
upon terra firma or over the transit corridors which dominated the
site, and made its development so problematic for so long.
Although the MTA had depressed the Mass Pike below grade at this
location--in accord with the aforementioned planning principles--
to encourage subsequent development of this prominent site, it was
the encroaching introduction of looping entrance and exit ramps
connecting city streets to the Turnpike which caused the
constraints that prevented earlier, economically viable,
development.
In addition to the physical restrictions imposed by the highway
and its ramp network, there was the concomitant concern on the
part of developers that a project of such scope would be forced to
endure a long, and potentially painful, permitting process. Where
as such permitting concerns are not unique to air rights
development, the envisioned lack of flexibility which would be
imposed by the necessity of incorporating the air rights component
into the development presented additional problems. However, with
reference to Copley Place, one is able to examine the creativity
which overcame such concerns--a creativity which was all
encompassing, and included not only the private developer, his
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engineers, financiers and tenants, but included the public sector,
its community groups, city agencies, state authorities and federal
assistance programs.
Evolution:
With regard to Copley Place, the relationship between use and
design, on the one hand, and the underlying transit corridor, on
the other, proved to be an exceptionally interactive one. The
design changes and modifications which were required during the
development of the project were tempered by the ability to alter
or accommodate subsurface conditions so that the envisioned design
could be structurally supported. To quote UIDC:
The characteristics of these first alternatives reflect the
iterative process between the plan consultants and UIDC.
For example, the initial schemes (under the direction of
architect Ben Thompson) showed a coverage of the entire
site, with emphasis on low rise construction and pedestrian
walkways and courtyards connecting a series of separate
program elements...(However) as these plans progressed
increasing effort was made to locate tall buildings away
from the turnpike rights of way, railroad tracks and ramp
structures to avoid constructing major structures over these
site obstructions.(40)
Essentially, the relationship which developed between building
heights and corresponding site restrictions was fluid. As will be
demonstrated with reference to the cancelled Hancock complex, a
major factor that facilitated this fluidity and made many of the
proposed changes feasible was the fact that only a portion of the
air rights utilized by Copley were directly above the depressed,
immovable, Mass Pike. The vast majority of the air rights leased
were above elevated, and potentially movable, egress ramps. Key
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to the flexibility provided by these ramps was the Stuart Street
realignment. To quote Mr. Joliffe:
Stuart Street itself would be relocated to a position partly
over the Turnpike.. .The relocation of Stuart Street almost
doubled the triangular site's original 30,000 sq ft and
provided a viable site for the Westin Hotel (an original
joint venture partner who was a key tenant throughout the
design process). The rearrangement of the ramps, not
incidentally would also correct a notoriously confusing pair
of turnpike exits... (41)
Three additional key considerations are highlighted by the above
quote. First, it was that very triangular piece which initially
attracted developer interest to the site itself. As the largest
unencumbered piece of property--i.e. as the largest piece of terra
firma unrestricted by the Mass Pike or its ramps--developers were
interested in its real estate potential from the time of its
creation. However, insofar as the state held out for a developer
ready and willing to develop the entire site, it was possible to
devise a comprehensive scheme which ultimately presented the
developer with an originally unexpected bonus--the right to
enlarge that very desirable, and potentially very profitable,
piece of property. Second, in allowing the developer to maximize
this terra firma, not only did the MTA take a profound step in
ensuring the economic viability of the project, but was able to
improve its own transportation network. Third, the staying power
of a major anchor, in this case the Westin Hotel--an original
joint venture partner--was a crucial element in a process
complicated by so many variables.
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Project Parameters:
The scope of Copley Place was dramatically reconfigured many times
during its design and feasibility review process. While some of
those changes were the result of community recommendations
supported by city and state agencies, others were a function of
shifting economic conditions.
In terms of considering those changes fostered by community
recommendations, the most significant to analyze for the purpose
of our study is the Citizens Review Committee's insistence upon
the total development of the site. A key concern of the CRC was
to ensure that, insofar as possible, neighborhoods which were torn
asunder by the introduction of the site's transit corridors would
be re-connected. With reference to the CRC guidelines, it was
stated that:
The entire site must be committed to development and
construction as a single, integrated project... This applies
specifically to Parcel C. (The parcel of land around Ramp C
fronting on Dartmouth St, the Mass Turnpike and the Penn
Central tracks.)(42)
Whereas other recommendations of the CRC were exceptionally far
reaching--such as their insistence upon the inclusion of a housing
component in the ultimate configuration--these types of community
considerations are not unique to air rights projects, nor did they
pose a specifically unique problem requiring a unique solution
for Copley. However, the aforementioned insistence on the
inclusion of parcel "C" was truly exceptional, for, if developed,
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the result would be the creation of a Mass Pike tunnel extending
nearly 4,000 feet. The cost of the lighting and, more
specifically, the requirements of ventilation necessitated by such
a tunnel were not negligible, and would constitute part of the
premium costs which would require federal funding. To quote:
By covering the turnpike, Copley Place in effect created a
tunnel between the Hancock Garage and the Prudential Center
(two other structures over it) that is almost a mile long.
To ventilate the Copley Place Portion, a structure 90 ft
high was placed on the north face of the project.(43)
Interestingly, this particular facet of the development highlights
the way in which multi-party creativity was focused on
accommodating those conflicting goals brought into high relief by
the intricacies of air rights construction. Whereas the
communities recommendation for continuity could have run head long
into the developers desire to leave this particular parcel
undeveloped so that the natural venting of the Mass Pike could be
maintained, the assistance provided by public agencies worked to
facilitate resolution. As alluded to earlier, the developers
reluctance and/or inability to fund these, and other requisite
site improvements, was offset by the recognition of the fact that
financial assistance would be provided. The UIDC report on the
Copley Place Project stated:
Unusual site conditions and certain community planning
requirements have created extra, or premium costs in the
construction of Copley Place. Generally speaking these
premium costs might be thought of as costs that would not
occur in the development of a typical, non 'air rights'
urban site. Here are some Copley Place examples:
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1. Deck structures necessary to span the turnpike lanes and
ramps, and railroad tracks that run through the site and
ventilation costs created by closing in the open turnpike
area.
2. Turnpike ramp relocations and temporary traffic
re-routings during construction.
3. A pedestrian bridge over Huntington Avenue linking Copley
Place to the back Bay.
UIDC contractors and cost estimators have calculated a total
of over $27,500,000 in Copley Place premium costs. The
project itself can absorb approximately $8,800,000 in
premium costs. (This is made possible, in part, because of
adjustments in land rent payments made by the owner of the
project site, the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority.) The
remaining short fall in premium cost funding, approximately
$18,800,000 must be provided through public funding.(44)
Ultimately this funding was provided through the UDAG program--
whose contributions and loans totalled approximately $15,800,000--
and the Federal Highway Administration Urban Assistance Program--
whose funding reached approximately $3,000,000.(45)
Moving to a consideration of the ways in which the Copley team was
forced to adjust their project to address the dictates of the
private sector, one must consider the evolution of the proposed
product mix. Although initially envisioned as a mixed use complex
with a strong retail emphasis anchored by two (then three)
department stores coupled to a single hotel and including an
office component, the focus of the development was to change
radically. Ultimately, Copley Place evolved into a hotel/office
complex with a relatively small, but exceptionally vibrant, retail
component comprised primarily of specialty stores. The reasons
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for this change in scope are many--not the least of which was the
fact that Federated Department Stores withdrew it commitment to
locate a Bloomingdales at Copley Place. This withdrawal was a
function of Filene's insistence that the parent company--
Federated-- should not introduce this element of internal
competition. With the loss of Bloomies, the other retail anchors
lost interest in the project, and also withdrew. Fortunately,
this fallout began prior to actual construction--unfortunately,
it occurred after final design approval.
However the requisite flexibility did exist to hold the project
together--not only on the part of the developer, the architects,
and the engineers, but also on the part of the Citizens Review
Committee, the city, and the state. As mentioned earlier, the
developer and his engineers increasingly focused on the necessity
of building maximum density on those parcels unencumbered by
transit corridors. This resulted in final plans--and actual
construction--calling for two hotel towers to be built upon terra
firma, while providing for the central area which traversed the
air rights component of the site to accommodate a less dense
retail mall as well as four mid-rise office blocks. The CRC was
able to ensure that its final recommendations were not violated,
and in keeping with the previously discussed capitalization of
income approach, the state was able to re-negotiate its lease with
UIDC. To quote UIDC once again:
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When the program for Copley Place changed in the spring of
1979, the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority amended its Lease
Agreement with UIDC to reflect the changes that occurred in
project composition. The Air Rights Lease of December 22,
1978 was, therefore, amended with revised financial terms
defining new rent payments and schedule. The amended lease
became effective on January 31, 1980.(46)
Substructure and Superstructure:
As the foregoing argument has demonstrated, there was a great deal
of flexibility for Copley given the size of the site, the fact
that the site itself was composed of considerable terra firma in
addition to the Pike and its ramps, and given the desire of all
participants to ensure that the site be developed. However, there
are inherent limits to flexibility, and many of the existent
design elements comprising Copley Place are a response to those
components which were beyond feasible alteration.
For example, the final triangular design of the Westin Hotel is a
function of the terra firma configuration created by the
alteration of Stuart Street. Although a more traditional design
was envisioned by the architects, the loading limitations imposed
by highway adjacency coupled with the fiscal need to maximize
hotel rooms, dictated final design.
Similarly, the elevators which carry the shopper, hotel guest,
office worker, etc., twenty five feet above city street level is
necessitated by the clearance requirements of the egress ramps
which are elevated above the Pike.
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Additionally, the inward looking elements of Copley Place--which
still exist despite the best efforts of community groups to
integrate the development with their surrounding neighborhoods--
is a function of the ferocious traffic fostered by the underlying
Pike which encircles the development itself.
Ultimately, one cannot help but be impressed by the creative set
of inter-relationships which existed between key components of the
project--be they physical or technical, personal or political--
which fostered the successful development of Copley Place.
VI.2. THE HANCOCK OFFICE/GARAGE COMPLEX:
Although this proposed mixed use air rights development was
cancelled prior to the start of construction, the design of the
project had progressed in sufficient detail for it to enlighten
our inquiry.
The complex was due to have been built adjacent to Hancock's
existing garage, and bordered by Clarendon Street, Stanhope Street
and Cahners Place. The project was designed to be constructed in
the air rights spanning six lanes of the Mass Pike, and two rail
tracks. In addition, the development was to have been anchored by
an adjacent piece of terra firma currently owned by Hancock. The
MTA is sole owner of the land beneath the Pike and the adjacent
rails--the tracks exist as a surface easement only. The total
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site area was approximately 42,000 square feet, of which
approximately 25,000 sq.ft. was highway airspace, 5,000 sq.ft.
was fixed rail air space, and 12,000 sq.ft. was terra firma. The
projected total development costs were calculated to be
$30,000,000.
An interesting mix of uses was envisioned. Not only did the
proposed project contain office space, ground floor retail, and
parking, but it was slated to be the new home of the Back Bay Post
Office. In total, the building was designed to rise 100 ft. above
street level.
The principal architect/engineer design group for the project was
Zaldastani Associates of Copley Place fame. Although detailed
negotiations with the MTA were not instituted, Zaldastani was able
to establish detailed plans and substantial cost estimates based
on their previous experience with Mass Pike air rights
development. For example, pro formas were based on the
availability of ninety nine year leases, the air rights were
valued at ten percent of the total development costs, and
technical engineering options were developed.
As it was envisioned, a row of columns would penetrate the median
strip of the Mass Pike to act as center supports for the proposed
platform. The platform itself was to have been constructed at
street level due to the desire to minimize the transition problems
which normally create an aesthetic tension between platform and
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existing streets. Given that the Mass Pike is below city street
grade at the proposed location, and is unencumbered by elevated
access ramps, this smooth transition could have been realized.
Planning decisions did not focus on efforts to maximize density
upon the terra firma portion of site. This absence of density
emphasis was a function of the fact that the entire structure was
designed to conform to applicable zoning statutes for the area.
As such, there was no need to concentrate density on the terra
firma, for the entire 100 ft. structure could be supported by the
proposed platform. With this said, however, there was a conscious
effort to locate all elevators at the terra firma side of the site
in order to accommodate the elevator pits. Additionally, this
piece of unencumbered land was to have been the staging are for
the construction of the corridor spanning platform.
It was envisioned that one to two lanes on each side of the median
strip wold be closed to traffic from approximately midnight to six
in the morning weekdays, and for longer periods as required on the
weekends. Approximately one year was planned for major
construction.
Interestingly, the demise of the project was a function of two
inter-related factors. First, the general slowdown in the office
market mitigated some of Hancock's enthusiasm for the project.
Second, the Neighborhood Association of the Back Bay was prepared
to resist the project unless convinced the parking component would
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not add to the vehicular congestion of the city streets. As
originally designed, the Neighborhood Associations fears would
have been unfounded, for Hancock/Zaldastani had planned a sky
bridge to run across and above Clarendon Street to connect the
new garage with their existing facility. The value of this sky
bridge link between the two garages lay in the fact that the
existing garage, built in Mass Pike air rights, was designed with
spiral access ramps tying directly into the Pike below. As such,
it was envisioned that the new garage would be able to acccess
those same spiral ramps via the linking bridge. However, the BRA
was adamantly opposed to the construction of a sky bridge, and
without this above ground link the new garage was forced to
access city streets. Accordingly, neighborhood resistance to the
project on the grounds of increased traffic congestion became
considerable.
The next move focused on mitigating those traffic concerns by
working with the MTA and the City to add additional access ramps
to the Pike--specifically an eastbound onramp at Arlington Street
and a westbound off ramp at Berkeley Street. These same two
access ramps are being pursued in relation to traffic mitigation
concerns involving the Prudential Center redevelopment. However,
for the Hancock project, the developers enthusiasm had run out--
neighborhood traffic concerns tipped the balance away from the
project in a softening market.
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Interestingly, the last chapter may not as yet be written--Hancock
still holds an option on the air rights involved, and future
conditions may change which would make the project more palatable.
To quote Mr. Joliffe one final time:
The obstacles to air rights construction are not
insurmountable ones. Indeed the growing interest in various
cities in the potential benefits of high way air rights
development may eventually make this process common. The
impetus may be coming, however, not from development needs,
but from efforts to improve transportation.(46)
VII. CONCLUSIONS:
Air rights--a unique medium with intriguing potential and awesome
complexity, subject to extraordinary constraints.
Having delineated the most compelling reasons which advocate air
rights development in the airspace above existing urban transit
corridors--as well as having highlighted the most daunting
obstacles to their implementation--the question remains: what role
will air rights play in the future? What place will air rights
hold in the revitalization of our urban centers? Both are,
unfortunately, difficult questions to answer. However, one may
conjecture.
Technology will move forward. Continued technical and
engineering innovation will mitigate many of the costs and
constraints which currently plague air rights construction. As
lighter superstructure systems are developed, as new foundation
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techniques are employed, as platform systems are refined, etc.,
buildings which are built in airspace will become more versatile.
The current restrictions with regard to sizing and density will
become less onerous as greater distances can be spanned, and
greater heights realized. There shall always be premium costs
associated with air rights construction, and those costs may tend
to mitigate private sector interest in air rights development.
However, technological innovation can be seen to be one of many
elements which may coalesce and contribute to the widening of
profit margins on proposed air rights projects. As returns are
improved, the reservations which currently plague air rights
development will be lessened.
Real estate will become more valuable. The vast tracts of land
which are currently occupied by highways and fixed rail tracks
will forever loom as bastions of potential profit and social
remedy. As downtown development progressed over the past two
decades in the older urban centers where the presence of transit
corridors cutting through the city fabric posed a problem, "good"
terra firma sites were the first to be purchased and built.
However, as those viable sites are developed and lost to future
expansion, the airspace above transit corridors will become a
logical, perhaps inevitable, venue for further development.
Whereas one must recognize the existence of viable terra firma
sites in the currently suburban and rural areas of the country,
and whereas the existence of such available terra firma may (once
again) mitigate private sector development interest in air rights
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projects, America's major urban centers--such as Boston--have
proven quite resilient. As such, the increasing value of downtown
property will facilitate actualization of the aforementioned
economic thresholds which are necessary to justify the premium
costs of air rights development.
Public agencies will become more creative. Those bodies empowered
with rationally planning for the future will increasingly focus
their attention on grafting life upon their moribund scars. As
terra firma locales are "rescued" through new development, and as
the ever growing demand for tax revenue proceeds, states and
cities may more aggressively advocate and encourage the
development of their airspace. One can see such encouragement
taking many forms. For example, there may be increasing
acceptance of the sole source designation used at Copley Place,
whereby the city and state chose a developer based on his team
composition and development experience in order to expeditiously
pursue feasibility studies and implement community
recommendations. There may be an increasing readiness to
discount air rights value and their lease terms in order to
encourage specific product type or general fiscal viability. One
can envision comprehensive planning frameworks being implemented
to demystify the process of air rights development itself.
Furthermore, institutionalized cooperation--reminiscent of the
Development Cabinet which facilitated inter-agency public sector
coordination for Copley Place--may be established to expedite the
complex process of permitting and approvals. As public agencies
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become more pro-active, and as financial incentives become more
prominent, private sector confidence will gain in stature. As
this confidence rises, so will the superstructures.
Neighborhood organizations will be more involved. As efforts to
knit together communities torn asunder by the introduction of
transit corridors gains momentum, and as traffic concerns rise in
prominence, the unused space above urban transit corridors may be
linked to efforts to address both problems. Witness the Scondras
legislation and the community component of the Turnpike Plan
acceptance process. However, it must be noted that increased
community involvement may empower those groups or individuals
opposed to any form of development--even those forms which negate
unsightly transit corridors. One only needs to examine the
example of the Hancock garage to witness an air rights project
whose demise was at least partially a function of community
opposition. However, given the fact that the interplay between
interested public agencies, potential private developers and a
concerned citizenry will inevitably loom as a major factor during
the approval process of any new development, air rights projects
are uniquely positioned to provide numerous benefits to impacted
neighborhoods which similar terra firma projects could not
possibly provide. As such, it is not unreasonable to foresee a
scenario whereby the added amenity of overcoming the negative
aspects of exposed transit corridors may positively influence
community support. Neighborhoods have not been seen to suspend
their demands simply to remove the intrusion of transit corridors,
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but their removal may prove a valuable benefit in development
negotiations.
Developers will become more aggressive. As past successes can be
identified, the potential to profit from air rights development
will become more firmly established. For example, the success of
Copley Place can be measured not only in terms of developer
prestige, but in true economic meter. The hotels are active, the
office space leased, and the retail component remains one of
Boston's most fashionable. Furthermore, Copley Place successfully
established the fact that acceptable design can spring forth from
unusual subsurface constraints. Although the Hancock project was
not actualized, and whereas such a scenario may lay doubt to the
viability of air rights development, the project was not cancelled
due to constraints unique to air rights, but to neighborhood
resistance to perceived traffic congestion. The air rights
components were resolved in a fairly straight forward manner based
on the experiences realized from developing Copley Place and
Hancock's own existing air rights garage. Essentially, increased
private sector familiarity with the medium of air rights will
encourage its further development.
Whereas the above projections may appear to be rather optimistic,
the assumptions behind them are pragmatic. Civilizations grow on
the basis of rational optimism with regard to the future. Air
rights development is rational, and it will be an increasingly
important concept in our future.
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